Options Every UK Director Should Know About Before Speaking to an Insolvency Practitioner
The conversation tends to follow a predictable pattern.
A UK company director, somewhere along the long curve of declining cash flow and accumulating creditor pressure, finally accepts that the situation has moved beyond what they can manage on their own. They speak to their accountant. The accountant, after a sympathetic but pessimistic review of the numbers, suggests a meeting with an Insolvency Practitioner. The meeting is arranged. The director, who has never been through anything like this before, walks into a room with somebody who has done it several thousand times.
What happens next, in the great majority of cases, is that the director is presented with a recommendation. Sometimes one option. Sometimes two. The recommendation is usually framed with the authority of long professional experience, and it is almost always accepted.
The argument that runs through Matt Haycox’s book RIGGED: The Directors’ Survival Manual is that this conversation, structured in this way, is the moment at which most British directors lose control of their own situation. Not because the recommendation they receive is necessarily wrong. But because they have walked into the conversation without understanding the full menu of options that, in principle, ought to be on the table.
“Most directors are told one option,” Haycox says. “Sometimes two. They’re rarely told all of them, because the people doing the telling don’t benefit from them understanding the full picture. Nobody is going to broaden the conversation for you. You have to walk in already knowing what’s available.”
This is a guide to what is available. It is not a substitute for legal or restructuring advice from a properly qualified professional. It is the framework that every director should have in their head before they sit down with anybody whose fee depends on which procedure is chosen.
Option One: Pay the Debt
The most overlooked option in the entire toolkit, and the one most directors dismiss without genuinely examining, is paying the underlying debt.
This sounds obvious to the point of being absurd. It is included on the list precisely because, in a startling number of cases, it is the option that has not been seriously evaluated. Directors who have spent months operating under the assumption that the company cannot generate the cash to clear the liability often, on closer inspection, find that the position is more nuanced. Asset disposals that had not previously been considered. Receivables that can be accelerated. Refinancing facilities that could clear the immediate pressure even if the underlying business remains stretched. Personal funds that the director had ruled out for emotional reasons rather than financial ones.
The point is not that paying the debt is always feasible. It often is not. The point is that the evaluation needs to happen, in detail, before the conversation moves to procedural alternatives. An Insolvency Practitioner does not earn fees from a director who pays their creditors and continues trading. The evaluation of whether payment is feasible is, accordingly, not a conversation that always happens with appropriate rigour at the start of professional engagement.
Option Two: Time to Pay Arrangement
For directors facing pressure specifically from HMRC, the time to pay arrangement is the formal mechanism by which a tax liability can be paid in instalments over an agreed period rather than in a single demand.
The arrangement is, in principle, available to any company that can demonstrate the underlying viability to meet the instalments. It is not, in practice, granted automatically, and HMRC’s appetite for granting it has tightened considerably in the post-pandemic enforcement environment. A serious time to pay application requires realistic financial projections, evidence of the company’s ability to meet the proposed schedule, and, in many cases, payment of a substantial sum upfront as a demonstration of commitment.
The reason time to pay arrangements are mentioned less frequently than they should be is that they generate no fees for Insolvency Practitioners. A director who successfully negotiates a time to pay arrangement does not need an insolvency procedure. The negotiation is, in most cases, something the director can do directly with HMRC, sometimes with the assistance of an accountant or specialist tax adviser, without entering the formal insolvency system at all.
For directors whose primary creditor pressure is from HMRC, and whose underlying business remains viable, this is the option that ought to be evaluated before any other procedural conversation begins.
Option Three: Informal Arrangement With Creditors
Outside the formal insolvency framework, it is possible — and in many cases preferable — to negotiate informal arrangements directly with creditors. A trade creditor pressing for payment can often be persuaded to accept a staged repayment over an extended period, particularly if the alternative is the company’s collapse and the loss of the entire receivable. A landlord can sometimes be persuaded to accept a rent concession in exchange for a longer lease commitment. A lender can sometimes be persuaded to restructure facilities rather than enforce them.
Informal arrangements have the advantage of being faster, cheaper, and less procedurally constraining than any formal insolvency process. They have the disadvantage of being non-binding, meaning that a creditor who agrees to an informal arrangement can, in principle, change their mind. They also do not bind dissenting creditors — a deal struck with the largest trade creditor does not prevent a smaller creditor from petitioning to wind the company up.
For directors whose creditor base is concentrated, and whose individual creditors have a commercial interest in seeing the business survive, this is often the most underused option in the toolkit. It generates no fees for Insolvency Practitioners. It is rarely the first suggestion in a formal advice meeting.
Option Four: Company Voluntary Arrangement
A Company Voluntary Arrangement, commonly abbreviated to CVA, is the most widely misunderstood option in the formal insolvency toolkit.
In simple terms, a CVA is a legally binding agreement between the company and its creditors under which the creditors agree to accept a negotiated portion of what they are owed, paid over an extended period, in exchange for the company continuing to trade. The arrangement requires approval from creditors representing 75 per cent in value of those voting, and once approved, it binds all unsecured creditors regardless of how they voted.
The CVA is, in many cases, the procedure most likely to preserve an underlying viable business while restructuring its debt burden. It is, accordingly, often the procedure that is least enthusiastically presented to directors by Insolvency Practitioners whose fee income is structured around full liquidation work. A CVA generates fees, but the fees are substantially smaller than those generated by a Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation.
The conditions for a CVA to make sense are reasonably specific. The underlying business needs to be capable of generating sufficient cash flow to meet the agreed contributions over the life of the arrangement. The creditor base needs to be persuadable that a CVA will recover more than a liquidation would. The directors need to be willing to operate under the supervision of a Nominee and, subsequently, a Supervisor for the duration of the arrangement.
For directors whose business is fundamentally viable but is being dragged down by a specific historical debt burden, this is the option that most often ought to be on the table and most often is not.
Option Five: Administration
Administration is a formal insolvency procedure under which an administrator is appointed to manage the company with the aim of achieving one of three statutory objectives: rescuing the company as a going concern, achieving a better result for creditors than would be obtained in an immediate liquidation, or realising property to make a distribution to secured or preferential creditors.
The procedure offers a critical practical benefit that no other procedure provides: a statutory moratorium on creditor action from the moment the administration begins. This means that, immediately on appointment of an administrator, creditors cannot pursue legal action against the company, cannot enforce security without the administrator’s consent, and cannot proceed with winding-up petitions. The moratorium creates the breathing space that, in many cases, is the most valuable single resource a distressed company can obtain.
Administration is more expensive than a CVA but cheaper than a full compulsory liquidation in terms of the cost to creditors of the underlying business. It is the procedure most commonly used where a sale of the business as a going concern is feasible but cannot be executed under the time pressure of imminent creditor enforcement.
For directors whose business has underlying value but is facing acute short-term creditor pressure, particularly winding-up petitions, this is the option that is most often the realistic alternative to compulsory liquidation. It is also one of the options that most directors have never heard of in any specific detail before they encounter it in a formal advice meeting.
Option Six: Pre-Pack Administration
A pre-pack administration is a specific variant of administration in which the sale of the business is negotiated and agreed before the administrator is appointed. The administrator, on appointment, executes the pre-agreed sale, usually within hours or days of the formal commencement of the procedure.
The pre-pack has the advantage of preserving business continuity to a degree that almost no other procedure can match. Customers, suppliers, and employees can, in many cases, experience the transition with minimal disruption. The underlying operating business survives, even though the legal entity that previously housed it does not.
The pre-pack is also one of the most procedurally controversial options in the UK insolvency toolkit. It has, historically, attracted criticism for the speed with which it transfers business assets from a failing company to a successor entity, often involving the same directors, in ways that leave unsecured creditors with little practical recourse. Reforms to pre-pack regulation, including the requirement for independent evaluation of connected-party sales, have addressed some of these concerns but not eliminated them.
For directors whose business has been offered for sale, where there is a credible buyer (which may include the existing directors operating through a new entity), and where speed of execution is critical, the pre-pack is the option that combines administration’s procedural protections with the commercial efficiency of an immediate sale.
Option Seven: Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation
A Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation, commonly abbreviated to CVL, is the procedure under which the directors of an insolvent company resolve to wind the company up voluntarily, and creditors are convened to appoint a liquidator to realise the company’s assets and distribute the proceeds.
The CVL is the procedure most commonly recommended by Insolvency Practitioners to directors of distressed companies, and it is the procedure that generates the largest fee income for the practitioners conducting it. These two facts are connected. This is not a suggestion that the CVL is the wrong procedure in any individual case; it is, in many cases, the correct procedure. It is a suggestion that the frequency with which it is recommended needs to be evaluated in the context of the incentive structure that surrounds the recommendation.
A CVL is appropriate where the company has no realistic prospect of trading out of its difficulties, where no underlying business has sufficient value to support a CVA or administration, and where the orderly realisation of assets for the benefit of creditors is the best outcome available. For some companies, in some circumstances, this is genuinely the case.
For other companies, in other circumstances, it is not. The director walking into the conversation needs to be able to distinguish between the two.
Option Eight: Compulsory Liquidation
Compulsory liquidation is the procedure that follows a successful winding-up petition. It is the procedure least controlled by the director, since it is initiated by a creditor and executed under the direction of the Official Receiver, often with a subsequently appointed liquidator from the private sector.
For directors, compulsory liquidation is, in almost every case, the worst available outcome from a personal liability perspective. The investigation into directors’ conduct is more rigorous than in voluntary procedures. The scope for negotiating personal exposures is narrower. The reputational consequences are more public. The procedure is, almost without exception, the procedure that the previous options on this list exist to avoid.
This is the option that arrives by default if the other options are not actively pursued. It is included on the list not as a recommendation but as a description of what happens to directors who do not engage with the earlier options in time.
What the List Is For
The point of having this menu in mind, before walking into any meeting with any Insolvency Practitioner, is not to challenge the recommendation that will eventually be made. It is to evaluate it.
A recommendation to enter a CVL may be the right recommendation. A recommendation to enter administration may be the right recommendation. A recommendation to negotiate a time to pay arrangement may be the right recommendation. None of these recommendations can be properly evaluated, however, by a director who walks into the conversation with no independent understanding of what the alternatives are.
“Nobody is going to broaden the conversation for you,” Haycox says. “If you don’t walk in knowing what’s on the menu, you’ll be served whatever the kitchen wants to serve. That’s not a metaphor about advice. That’s a literal description of how it works.”
The 200+ pages of RIGGED, published through Insolvency.World, treat each of these options in considerably more detail than this guide allows, including the specific circumstances in which each is realistic, the fee implications for the professionals involved, and the personal liability consequences for the directors. The book does not replace proper professional advice. It equips the director receiving it to ask better questions of the people providing it.
For a director sitting at a kitchen table tonight, weighing a meeting they have scheduled for next week, that may be the most useful preparation they can do.
The recommendation, when it comes, will sound authoritative. It may even be correct. But it can only be evaluated against the menu it sits on. And the menu, on the evidence of the directors who have walked into these meetings before, is almost always wider than the one being presented.
Haycox has also built a wider platform around business, finance and entrepreneurship, with further resources available on Matt Haycox’s official website.
